By Samikchhya Bhusal
Executive Summary
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) emerged in the late 1990s as tools for communities to mitigate the impact of developments through concessions from the developer. Supporters of CBAs argue that these agreements grant community control over land use decisions and projects. Scholars have highlighted how CBAs benefit both developers and community groups. Conspicuously absent within this literature, however, is a substantive discussion of how developments covered by a CBA change adjacent neighborhoods. Additionally, few scholars have assessed the extent to which CBAs actually empower communities and residents near these developments. This report seeks to reframe CBAs by exploring these gaps in literature. In doing so, this report contributes to ongoing organizing efforts pushing for community autonomy and the right to decide what gets built — or does not. Key findings of this report are:
- In Los Angeles, news reports by the Los Angeles Times have tended to brand developments covered by a CBA with a “revitalization” narrative. Typically, this narrative includes claims of new jobs and improved public safety. The Los Angeles Times, in using this story, fails to acknowledge the effects on working-class residents of neighborhoods in CBA-covered developments. Specifically, the Los Angeles Times fails to examine how development can displace residents and increase policing, both of which can disproportionately impact low-income communities that live near development supported by CBAs. In addition, while the Los Angeles Times writes about rosy promises of revitalization and redevelopment, very few reporters follow up to explore the actual outcomes of CBAs.
- In the city of Los Angeles, the general public typically cannot access information about the implementation of CBAs, including annual reports on living wage jobs and annual reports on percentage of retail space occupied by local small businesses. When information about CBA implementation is kept private, community members cannot hold developers accountable.
- According to key markers, residents in Los Angeles neighborhoods with CBAs are experiencing gentrification at a rapid rate. From 2000 to 2018, neighborhoods with CBAs underwent an increase in median household income and average gross rent at a rate noticeably greater than the city of LA as a whole. In addition, most tracts near CBAs experienced rapid ethnic changes, with an increase in the percent of non-hispanic white residents; the percent of non-hispanic white residents declined in the city of LA over the same time period. Gains in educational attainment in census tracts near CBAs also exceeded the citywide average. These trends indicate that CBAs fail to prevent or slow gentrification, as is sometimes claimed. Given these gentrification effects near CBA supported developments, this report provides an opening to refuse CBAs as tools to facilitate development processes.
- CBAs in LA are primarily a story of negotiated defeats. By the time CBAs are signed, developers have already decided the fate of the community. The logic of negotiations that CBAs promote, is, thus, against the self-determination of communities.
- Alternatives to CBAs do exist. As anti-gentrification organizers in LA have shown, communities can present an alternative framework which rejects the myth that development is an inevitable process. The right of a community to envision a future they want is non-negotiable. This report calls for efforts that fight for community veto power over development, and the right for self-determination in the face of the plans of developers.
The Canon of CBAs
About CBAs
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) are legally binding contracts between a coalition of community groups and developers.1 These agreements outline public benefits that a private developer will provide in return for the community’s political support for the proposed development.2
In general, the signatories, negotiations, and timeline of CBAs vary by development projects. CBAs are usually signed between developers, on the one hand, and labor unions and community organizations in affordable housing and environmental justice, on the other hand.3 CBA negotiations frequently include living wage requirements, local hiring, and affordable housing as common topics.4 In some CBAs, developers agree to make a one-time payment for community centers and health centers. Investment in parks and child care centers are other examples of CBA provisions. For developments with significant environmental effects, communities may incorporate environmental impact studies into CBAs. The length and duration of negotiation varies by project.
Scholars often portray promised community benefits under CBAs as success stories.5 For example, in 2011, the Public Law Center, an institute within Tulane Law School, assessed implementation outcomes of 18 CBAs. This assessment showed that ten of the eighteen CBAs were successfully implemented; the remaining eight CBAs faced delays in the delivery of community benefits.6 Such assessments tend to ignore how these CBAs affected residents and whether community members approved these developments.
CBA implementation also varies widely by project. Some CBAs establish separate implementation committees to monitor compliance. Others rely on community organizations and municipal authorities for monitoring.7
Context for CBAs
CBAs emerged in the late 1990s within the context of economic growth policies, massive redevelopment projects, and limited community control over land-use decisions. The practice of CBAs sprung from the local labor movement in Los Angeles, following the increased community presence of unions in Los Angeles in the 1990s.8 To accelerate economic growth, many cities invested public money to create stadiums, hotels, residential complexes, and retail centers.9 Proponents of these investments promised job creation and increased tax revenues in neighborhoods facing disinvestment.10 Policymakers used the promise of tax revenues to justify public subsidies for redevelopment projects. Meanwhile, opponents of these redevelopment projects raised concerns of residential displacement and increasing housing costs among low-income communities.11 In this context, CBAs became community responses to inequitable development practices.12 The movement for community benefits stressed that economic development should bring permanent benefits to low-income neighborhoods affected by developments.13
CBAs emerged as a tool for community control over development decisions and direct participation in the planning and development process. Representatives of the community could in theory negotiate directly with developers over whatever issues they found most pressing in the community, and ensure that the new project would address these concerns.14 In 1998, the first CBA was negotiated by community groups and the developer for the development of the Hollywood and Highland Center in Los Angeles.15 It is worth noting that while the Hollywood and Highland Center CBA was the first CBA, the CBA for Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District (LA Live) is regarded as the first full-fledged CBA.16
Since the Hollywood and Highland project, CBAs have become relatively common in cities across the United States. As of September 2020, a website documenting CBAs identified a total of 28 CBAs in the US. 17 Since the late 1990s, community organizations and developers have signed at least 10 CBAs in LA (See Appendix 1 for a list of CBAs in LA). A CBA does not guarantee the success of a project. Of the 10 CBAs from the City of LA, two were never enacted because of developer bankruptcy or financial trouble.18
Stated Benefits of CBAs
Since the emergence of CBAs, scholars have argued that the practice can benefit both developers and community groups. For developers, CBAs can expedite or increase the chance of city approval for development projects.19 In addition, with CBAs, developers sometimes find it much easier to access public subsidies.20 For example, the City of LA initially allocated $31 million in funds for developers of NoHo Commons (a mixed-use development project in North Hollywood). After developers signed a CBA, the city increased total subsidies to $44 million.22
Similarly, scholars view CBAs as tools to ensure community participation in the development process. By allowing residents to raise concerns of employment, housing, and living wage, CBAs aid communities to have a voice in development which formal channels, like city planning processes, might miss or ignore. In addition, by requiring developers to mitigate adverse impacts of development, CBAs increase developer accountability to the community for the long-term.23
Critiques of CBAs
While many stakeholders tout CBAs as absolute strategies to secure benefits for communities, some scholars critique CBAs on multiple grounds. First, depending on who represents the “community” in CBAs, these negotiations may run the risk of becoming non-representative, creating inappropriate concessions. CBA negotiations are voluntary; developers have some degree of freedom in who they chose as a counterparty in discussions. When community organizations signing CBAs are only those that developers want to work with, CBAs may risk co-optation.24 Consequently, the CBA may not reflect immediate needs of communities. Second, developer commitments in CBAs can be vague, making enforcement difficult. This issue manifests in questions of time and of material commitment. Third, the process of negotiating CBAs can be challenging at multiple levels. Community organizations may hire an attorney to help sign an enforceable contract, adding expenses to community groups.25 In addition, given the project-by-project nature of CBAs, community coalitions face a steep learning curve when they negotiate CBAs, adding challenges to the negotiation process.26 Finally, for communities that want to resist development completely, CBAs can simply become a tool for developers to “purchase public support” in return for inadequate community benefits.27
Research Gaps and Research Questions
Existing literature on CBAs fails to adequately address several key subjects. While scholars have documented the details of CBA negotiations, little research explores how the outcomes of these negotiations and the developments they advance affect communities. Perhaps more concerning, scholars typically frame discussion around CBAs by implicitly or explicitly arguing that development is inevitable. In doing so, they fail to challenge the idea that development might never occur at all without the fig leaf of a CBA. Existing literature has failed to acknowledge counter-cases in which community opposition was able to stop development entirely.
Few scholars have explored how development covered by CBAs affect immediate neighborhoods of the developments they promote. One notable exception is a study that points out the lack of research concerning the impacts of CBAs on individuals in neighborhoods of developments.28 While this research raises questions on impacts of CBAs, it does not go far enough to answer these questions. Besides, scholars tend to regard CBAs as a policy tool to secure community benefits and mitigate harms of developments, making them different from other developments. What is surprising is that despite claims of benefits of CBAs, a careful study of the effects of CBAs on adjacent neighborhoods is still missing. Scholars have so far failed to answer several key questions. What happens to communities where development projects are sited through CBAs? Do CBA related development projects result in significant demographic, economic, and social changes? Or do CBAs, as supporters argue, truly mitigate the impact of development on communities?
Existing scholarship underplays the key roles of monitoring and implementation processes of CBAs. Scholars tend to portray the CBA process as a discrete moment in time — parties bargain, sign an agreement, the development continues with new support. In reality, almost all CBAs extend through time deep into the future through long-term promises and detailed, sometimes complex, monitoring processes. Yet, most scholarship ignores this key side of the CBA. Communities have long struggled with how to monitor developments and ensure compliance under a CBA. In some cases, developers make a one-time lump-sum payment to their counterparties specifically to ease the burden of monitoring. In other cases, developers commit to make periodic reports on implementation of CBA provisions to community groups. While CBAs specify reporting requirements, existing agreements do not typically address how negotiators of CBAs will be held accountable to these agreements. Besides, who bears the burden of ensuring the effective implementation of CBA negotiations? What resources are allocated to monitor CBAs?
Existing literature also fails to address the backdrop under which CBAs are signed. Scholars have framed CBAs as tools to slightly shift the power dynamics in development projects, promoting accountable and equitable development.29 Yet existing literature lacks an analysis of the differences between initial community demands and actual outcomes of CBA negotiations. These studies focus on what communities get rather than what they surrender. Extant scholarship implicitly assumes that there is only a limited amount of power that communities can exercise. The faulty assumption that negotiations through CBAs necessarily build community power conceals the politics of development and governance that make CBAs allegedly necessary in the first place. In sum, existing scholarly work on CBAs does not critically analyze the actual gains and autonomy that CBAs provide or fail to provide.
Even the term ‘community’ in CBA deserves closer critique. Who is the community in a CBA? If developers may select community organizations they want to work with30, do CBAs truly promote democratic participation in development? Communities may face co-optation in CBA negotiations, which is why scholars need to understand who comprises a community in CBA.
This research project seeks to contribute to the growing literature of CBAs, with a focus on accountability, outcomes of CBAs, and community control over development decisions. Considering the limited tools available to communities to make their voices heard, some may think it is counterproductive to write about CBAs with such a critical lens. I counter that the unwillingness to examine the inner workings of CBAs inadvertently overlooks community control over land use and development decisions, giving a scholarly imprimatur to deep processes of gentrification and communal destruction. In this study, I seek to answer the following research questions, focusing my inquiry on the city of Los Angeles:
How do media brand developments supported through CBAs in their discussions to the public?
How do community coalitions maintain accountability in the monitoring and implementation of CBAs? Who is responsible for ensuring that CBA provisions are implemented? How are reporting requirements met?
How have neighborhoods which contain CBA approved developments in Los Angeles changed? Do neighborhoods near CBA development witness changes in economic, demographic, and social changes different from the city of LA?
How have communities exerted power over development without CBAs? How have community groups resisted negotiations for development or changed the paradigm of discussions between developers, community activists, and political structures?
Methods
This study involves a mixed methods approach combining qualitative methods such as long-form interviews, content analysis, document review, and data analysis.
I start with document analysis of existing CBAs in LA, most of which were publicly available through various sites on the internet. Then, to understand CBA implementation, I submitted Public Records Act requests (PRA) to the City of LA, Community Redevelopment Agency/Los Angeles (CRA/LA), and to city councilmember district offices for all districts containing a CBA. I also undertook an analysis of media reports produced by the Los Angeles Times pertaining to development with CBAs in LA.
After a review of documents and media reports, I conducted seven semi-structured virtual interviews (see Appendix 2 for interview questions) with individuals engaged in LA’s CBA negotiations. Interviewees included signatories of a total of 7 CBAs in LA: LA Live, Hollywood and Highland, Hollywood and Vine, NoHo Commons, Lorenzo project, Grand Metropolitan, and LAX expansion. While some interviewees signed only one CBA, others negotiated multiple CBAs. Most interviewees represented social justice non-profit organizations in LA.
Finally, I used census data to trace gentrification effects in census tracts within a half mile radius of CBA development. Because neighborhood change from a development can take time to fully manifest, I focused my analysis on CBAs signed before 2010. I do not include the LAX expansion CBA in my analysis because a half-mile radius around the airport is not enough to observe substantial neighborhood change.
Community Benefits Agreements in LA
CBA Information Availability
While scholars claim that CBAs ensure transparency in development31, information regarding CBA implementation is not easily available for CBAs in the city of Los Angeles. If CBAs guarantee community benefits, then why are annual and bi-annual reports unavailable to the public? In this section I describe findings from Public Records Act (PRA) concerning CBA implementation.
Public officials and government agencies in Los Angeles seem to lack information on outcomes of CBA-sponsored developments. I filed multiple requests under California’s PRA law to the City of LA, CRA/LA, and multiple City Council District offices all requesting specific outcome reports from CBAs in the City of LA. Although some CBAs, including the LA Live and NoHo Commons, require the developer to submit an annual report for any given year or partial year to the City Council’s Community and Economic Development Committee and the CRA/LA, the committee and the agency both failed to produce any such reports in response to my PRA request. Such outcomes from PRA law record requests indicate that the public entities tasked with oversight either never received status reports from developers, or that they do not safeguard the reports for public use. In either case, members of the public cannot access progress reports, raising questions about the degree of transparency CBAs actually guarantee.
In fact, between all of the branches of local government I approached, only a single page emerged. CRA/LA disclosed a single one-page document delineating 2010 local hire results for the Hollywood and Vine CBA. The City of LA failed to produce any annual status reports or any portion thereof in response to my PRA request. Only Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) maintains a website providing easy public access to materials regarding the LAX expansion CBA. This case is unique, however, since LAWA plays the role of the developer in this CBA. In general, the outcomes of my PRA requests reflect that the general public in LA has no way of determining whether benefits promised through CBAs actually happened.
Multiple interview subjects who had signed CBAs confirmed that the agreements are inherently private, despite their stated aim of benefiting a community. Community organizations that signed CBAs are often the only entities that can access developer’s reports on CBA implementation.32 If these groups decline to disclose reports, no one in the community can even evaluate the CBA’s success or failure accurately.
When city agencies, developers, and community organizations conceal CBA outcomes, two major consequences arise. First, community organizations that have signed CBAs face the sole burden of reviewing these reports and holding developers accountable. As CBA signatories note33, community organizations are often under-resourced to monitor CBA outcomes. Besides, additional resources are not allocated to monitor CBA implementation.34 Second, community members cannot hold developers accountable to their promises if city agencies, developers, and community organizations keep information regarding implementation private. Hidden implementation reports speak to the limited community control over CBAs, belying the frequent argument that such agreements are ultimately for the benefit of the communities which will be impacted by development.
Los Angeles Times Media Report Analysis: The Rosy Promise of Development
In this section, I examine how the Los Angeles Times portrayed development and redevelopment pursued through CBAs. Such an analysis allows us to understand the messaging about development and illuminates the link between CBAs and the myth that development and revitalization will somehow benefit everyone. While the Los Angeles Times wrote enthusiastically about redevelopment and their promises, reporters rarely followed up on the long-term effects on communities or even the basic promises of CBAs, including the promise of revitalization, jobs, and safety.
The Los Angeles Times used the “revitalization” narrative to brand the development projects with CBAs to the public. For example, a Los Angeles Times article articulated the mixed-use development project in NoHo Commons as a way to revitalize the core of North Hollywood.35 The director of the CRA/LA is quoted as the “director of the project to revitalize the core of North Hollywood.”36 Similarly, the Los Angeles Times framed the Hollywood and Highland project as a catalyst for an economic boom and a “new, cleaner Hollywood.”37 The Times also wrote about the Marlton Square Redevelopment as a “linchpin” to revitalize Southwest LA.38 Referring to the Marlton Square redevelopment, an article quotes then City Councilman Mark-Ridley Thomas as saying: “It is an important investment needed to replace the dilapidated Santa Barbara Plaza shopping center…This will be the catalytic project for the Baldwin-Hills, Crenshaw Communities.”39 Such framing of redevelopment as opportunities to create “new” cities erases the long history of communities that have lived in these neighborhoods.
The Los Angeles Times also portrayed development projects with CBAs as bringing increased job opportunities. Media reports from the Times cited high poverty and unemployment to highlight the promise for increased jobs. One article about the SunQuest Industrial Park development in Pacoima claimed that the “business park planned for (the) site of (a) closed dump and nearby yard could bring 1,000 jobs to troubled area.”40 In the same article, the Times quoted a member of the Neighborhood Improvement Organization, who said “It is a blighted community and we need the dignity of work.”41 The Times wrote similarly about job creation promised by developers through NoHo Commons redevelopment.42 These descriptions illustrate that job creation serves as a major justification to redevelopment and revitalization.
Pieces in the Los Angeles Times touted proposed development as a means of improving ‘public safety’ while failing to acknowledge how working-class residents, particularly working-class residents of color, experience the mechanisms of ‘safety.’ For example, media reports outlined improved safety as an outcome of the Hollywood and Highland development.43 Similarly, a Los Angeles Times article quoted a resident from Hollywood as saying, “It’s safer…There are more police.”44 While the same article quotes immigrant neighbors’ fear of police, the Times does not fully recognize the varied experiences of ‘public safety’ and policing in its narrative. The portrayal of improved safety as an outcome of development ignores the relationship of low-income communities with police brutality and police harassment. For low-income communities, police presence poses a risk of victimization.46 Hence, framing improved safety as a pretext for development, media narratives have adopted a willfully class-blind and race-blind understanding of safety.
Some media reports by the Los Angeles Times acknowledged concerns of businesses at risk of displacement. For instance, the Los Angeles Times wrote that the LAX expansion would “displace 190 firms employing thousands of people near the airport.” Similarly, another Los Angeles Times article reported the story of a luggage store owner who fought the city’s eminent domain in Hollywood and Vine.47 Focusing most of the article on the victory of a store owner, the Los Angeles Times reports neglected stories of other store owners who still faced the risk of displacement.
The perspectives of residents facing imminent displacement are shockingly absent from this reporting. Residents who actually experienced displacement from redevelopment are similarly invisible in the media narrative of redevelopment and revitalization. For example, in a Los Angeles Times article, a store manager in Hollywood and Highland “credited the project for driving away the drug dealers and other “bad people” who congregated on the blighted site before the complex was built.”48 In another article, the Los Angeles Times thus wrote, “Where squatters once slept in squalor, the young and hip now slouch in offices fueled by Intel and furnished by Ikea, creating the Hollywood of tomorrow.”49 These narratives put development’s anti-poor approach in stark relief, prioritizing the aesthetics of a city and economic vitality over any acknowledgement of already existing residents’ immediate needs and the right to remain.
In general, media narratives from the Los Angeles Times tell a story of the rosy promise of development, but fail to ask who benefits from revitalization and development projects, and who pays. The failure to critically examine beneficiaries and outcomes of development has two consequences. First, media reports by the Los Angeles Times do not question the flow of the city’s financial resources into development projects. Second, reports from the Los Angeles Times neglect the displacement effects on longtime residents and overall effects of development on existing residents. As shown in this section, media reports tend to justify development and redevelopment projects supported through CBAs under the guise of “cleaning” and “sanitizing” neighborhoods.
Contradictions of CBAs: Perspectives on Gentrification Effects of CBAs
In this section, I examine the neighborhood effects of development projects supported through CBAs. Given neighborhood changes take time, I focus my analysis on CBAs signed before 2010 in Los Angeles. Using four key gentrification markers alongside data on arrests and evictions, I show that accelerated gentrification occurred in neighborhoods with development supported through LA’s five CBAs (Hollywood and Highland, LA Live, NoHo Commons, Hollywood and Vine, and Grand Avenue) signed before 2010.
Selection of gentrification markers
I selected gentrification markers based on existing literature on neighborhood changes.50 While no single variable best measures gentrification, scholars have consistent findings on characteristics of gentrifying neighborhoods: neighborhoods experiencing gentrification often see an influx of some combination of wealthier, whiter, and highly educated residents.51
Following this scholarship, I used census data to track median household income and average gross rent as proxy variables for wealth. Similarly, I used census data on the percent of non-hispanic white residents as a proxy for neighborhood ethnic change, and percentage of college-educated individuals as a proxy for educational attainment. I used changes in police presence to study neighborhood changes, with Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) arrest data serving as a proxy variable for police activity. Some scholars suggest that gentrifying neighborhoods, particularly at earlier stages of gentrification, witness high rates of evictions.52 Thus, I incorporate data on Ellis Act eviction rates in this analysis. Ellis Act is a California state law that allows landlords to evict residential tenants for landlords to exit rental market business.53 This law permits landlords to flip rent stabilized units.
Overall Trends
From 2000 to 2018, neighborhoods with CBAs (namely LA Live, Grand Avenue, NoHo Commons, Hollywood and Vine, and Hollywood and Highland CBAs), underwent an increase in median household income and average gross rent at a rate noticeably greater than the city of LA as a whole. In addition, most tracts near CBAs experienced rapid ethnic changes, with an increase in the percent of non-hispanic white residents; the percent of non-hispanic white residents declined in the city of LA over the same time period. Gains in educational attainment in census tracts near CBAs also exceeded the citywide average. Police data was less definitive but still suggestive of increased policing in neighborhoods surrounding CBA developments. Between 2010 and 2018, the number of arrests declined throughout the city of LA, whereas arrests increased in the vicinty of two of the five developments (LA Live and Grand Avenue) in this study.
Neighborhood Changes in Detail
Economic Changes
From 2000 to 2018, census tracts near CBA development posted gains in median household income that outpaced the citywide average. Where the median household income (hereafter referred as income) in LA increased by only 2.3% between 2000 to 2010, neighborhoods with CBAs saw a remarkable increase of income (for instance, a mean increase of income by 86.2% in Hollywood and Highland and a mean increase of income by 138.5% in Grand Avenue). Similarly, census tracts near the NoHo Commons and LA Live saw a mean income increase of 45.9% and 7.6% respectively from 2000 to 2010. This increase coincided with an income rise greater than the citywide increase near Hollywood and Vine too.
Data from 2018 also reveal that census tracts near CBA projects had significant gains in income, relative to the city’s income increase. From 2000 to 2018, the median household income in LA increased by 5.3%. In Hollywood and Vine, census tracts witnessed a mean increase of income by 53.8% between 2000 and 2018. Census tracts near NoHo Commons also recorded higher gains in income from 2000 to 2018 (a mean increase of 47.1%) compared to the city of LA. At Hollywood and Highland too, tracts saw an increase in median household income (an increase of 98%) greater than the citywide income increase. The percent increase in income is astronomical in tracts near LA Live and Grand Avenue; tracts near LA Live and Grand Avenue saw income increase of 105.2% and 337.8% respectively. Economic data (as described here and illustrated in Figure 1 below) suggest an inflow of higher earning households into neighborhoods near developments projects with CBAs. One may argue that it is common for new developments to result in an inflow of wealthier households. What is at stake here is that while scholars have claimed that CBAs can address community concerns, changes in income near developments with CBAs suggest otherwise. Economic data indicates a change in composition of neighborhoods near projects with CBAs. Thus, despite CBAs, longtime residents likely faced risks of displacement resulting from the influx of higher earning households into neighborhoods near projects with CBAs.
Note: The reported values in the table represents the average (mean) of all census tracts within a half-mile radius of the development by projects. Source: 2000 and 2010 Census, ACS 2010 5-year estimates, and ACS 2018 5 -year estimates via Social Explorer
Neighborhoods with CBAs also recorded significant increases in average gross rent. From 2000 to 2010, average gross rent (hereafter referred to as rent) in the city of LA increased by 24.7%, whereas tracts near LA Live saw a mean increase of rent of 59.7%. Between 2000 and 2010, tracts near NoHo Commons, Hollywood and Highland, LA Live, and Grand Avenue also saw average gross rent increase by rates greater than citywide increase. By 2018, rent near developments with CBAs had climbed by rates much higher than the City of LA as a whole. From 2000 to 2018, the average gross rent in LA soared by 37.3%. During the same time, for example, rent increased by a rate ranging from 51% to 162% near developments with CBAs. (as shown in Table 1). Specifically, in and around Grand Avenue and LA Live, most tracts saw dramatic rent increases from 2000 to 2018. In general, observation of changes in rent also make the connection between CBA projects and the influx of wealthier households evident.
| Project | Percent Increase in Average Gross Rent from 2000 to 2010 | Percent Increase in Average Gross Rent 2000 to 2018 |
| Hollywood and Highland | 28.2 | 51.8 |
| Hollywood and Vine | 30.1 | 57.1 |
| NoHo Commons | 35.9 | 52.4 |
| LA Live | 59.7 | 129.3 |
| Grand Avenue | 76.2 | 162.3 |
| City of LA | 24.7 | 37.3 |
Note: The reported values in the table represents the average (mean) of all census tracts within a half-mile radius of the development by development projects. Source: 2000 and 2010 Census, ACS 2010 5-year estimates, and ACS 2018 5 -year estimates via Social Explorer.
Demographic changes
Demographic data certainly show an influx of white[55] residents in neighborhoods near development with CBAs. Gentrification scholars have consistently found that in-movers in gentrifying neighborhoods tend to be white, and residents impacted by gentrification tend to be people of color.[56] In the city of LA, the percentage of white residents decreased by 0.8 percentage points from 2000 to 2010. However, in tracts within a half-mile buffer of CBA projects, the percent of whites had increased. On average, in tracts near Hollywood and Vine, the percent of whites increased by 5.1 percentage points. Similarly, NoHo Commons saw an increase of percent white residents by 11.3 percentage points. The influx of white residents was visible in Hollywood and Highland, LA Live, and Grand Avenue as well (see Table 2). Such trends persist between 2000 to 2018 too. While the City of LA saw a decline in percent non-Hispanic whites by 1.3 percentage points, the percent of non-Hispanic whites increased for all five projects with CBAs.
| CBA Project | 2000 to 2010 | 2000 to 2018 |
| Hollywood and Highland | 3.5 | 0.4 |
| Hollywood and Vine | 5.1 | 6.8 |
| NoHo Commons | 11.3 | 12.4 |
| LA Live | 5.2 | 7.2 |
| Grand Avenue | 3.4 | 6.4 |
| City of LA | -0.8 | -1.3 |
Note: The reported values in the table represents the average (mean) of all census tracts within a half-mile radius of the development by development projects. Source: 2000 and 2010 Census, ACS 2010 5-year estimates, and ACS 2018 5 -year estimates via Social Explorer
An increase of percent whites in tracts with CBAs coincided with a corresponding decline in the population of Hispanic or Latino (of any race). In the city of LA, the percent Hispanic increased by 1.6 percentage points, whereas in NoHo Commons the percent Hispanic decreased by 11.2 percentage points. Similarly, LA Live, Hollywood and Highland, and Hollywood and Vine saw a corresponding percentage point decline of percent Hispanic. These demographic shifts are also visible between 2000 to 2018. While the percent Hispanic increased by 2.1 percentage points in the city of LA, neighborhoods adjacent to all five CBAs in this study witnessed an overall decline of the same population [see Table 3]. These racial/ethnic changes also illustrate accelerated gentrification and an overall change in neighborhood demographic composition that happened in neighborhoods in LA despite the CBAs. Once again, despite the wide claims that CBAs mitigate the negative effects of development and help secure community benefits, these findings suggest that Hispanic families near projects with CBAs faced great risks of displacement.
| CBA Project | 2000 to 2010 | 2000 to 2018 |
| Hollywood and Highland | -2.8 | -3.3 |
| Hollywood and Vine | -5.5 | -8.2 |
| NoHo Commons | -11.2 | -12.9 |
| LA Live | -5.8 | -12.9 |
| Grand Avenue | 0.9 | -4.8 |
| City of LA | 1.6 | 2.1 |
Note: The reported values in the table represents the average (mean) of all census tracts within a half-mile radius of the development by development projects. Source: 2000 and 2010 Census, ACS 2010 5-year estimates, and ACS 2018 5 -year estimates via Social Explorer
Educational Attainment
Similar to markers of income and demographics, scholars consistently find that gentrifying neighborhoods see an inflow of individuals with higher educational attainment. From 2000 to 2018, educational attainment in census tracts near development with CBAs outpaced the citywide average. The percent of LA residents 25 years and older with a Bachelor’s degree or higher increased by nearly 4.7 percentage points from 2000 to 2010. Meanwhile, in NoHo Commons, educational attainment levels grew by 16.8 percentage points (see Table 4). In tracts near Grand Avenue and Hollywood Vine too, educational attainment levels climbed by rates greater than citywide average (see Table 4). Similarly, from 2000 to 2018, educational attainment levels in the City of LA rose by 8.2 percentage points, whereas all five neighborhoods near CBA projects witnessed increases in educational attainments greater than the city average. Such increases in educational attainment levels also indicate that neighborhoods with CBA projects faced pressures of gentrification. The huge influx of individuals with higher levels of education can also signal increased investments in an area, exacerbating gentrification.
| CBA Project | 2000 to 2010 | 2000 to 2018 |
| Hollywood and Highland | 9.5 | 16.2 |
| Hollywood and Vine | 10.9 | 17.9 |
| NoHo Commons | 16.8 | 19.4 |
| LA Live | 9.5 | 24.3 |
| Grand Avenue | 12.4 | 25.8 |
| City of LA | 4.7 | 8.2 |
Note: The reported values in the table represents the average (mean) of all census tracts within a half-mile radius of the development by development projects. Source: 2000 and 2010 Census, ACS 2010 5-year estimates, and ACS 2018 5 -year estimates via Social Explorer.
Social Changes
Unlike economic and demographic data, arrests data do not tell a conclusive story of gentrification effects in neighborhoods with CBAs. Trends in arrests in Hollywood and the rest of the city of LA are similar. The city of LA witnessed a 36.1 percent decline in yearly arrests from 2010 to 2018. Between 2010 to 2018, three CBA projects near Hollywood (Hollywood and Highland, Hollywood and Vine, and NoHo Commons) recorded similar decline in arrest rates (see Table 5).
In downtown LA, rates of arrests exceed the citywide average. While the citywide arrests rate declined by 36.1%, in neighborhoods near LA Live arrest rates increased by 13.6%. Similarly, in Grand Avenue, the number of police arrests increased by 20.4%. These trends, though inconclusive, suggest the link between gentrification and increased police presence in census tracts near CBA projects in downtown LA. Given increased police presence is often a tool of social control to benefit wealthier and whiter residents and victimize communities of color , arrest data for downtown suggest disproportionate impacts of increased policing on communities of color and poorer residents.
| CBA Project | Percent Change from 2010 to 2018 |
| Hollywood and Highland | -32.7% |
| Hollywood and Vine | -37.7% |
| NoHo Commons | -56.2% |
| LA Live | 13.6% |
| Grand Ave | 20.4% |
| City of LA | -36.1% |
Note: The reported values in the table represents the average (mean) of all census tracts within a half-mile radius of the development by development projects. Source: Los Angeles Police Department.
Taken together, various data presented here underscore accelerated gentrification in development projects with CBAs in LA. Economic changes, racial/ethnic changes, and educational attainment changes clearly show that gentrification is occurring at a rapid rate despite CBAs. The analysis shows that CBAs are not alleviating the negative effects of development. Rather, these negotiations may have sparked other real estate investments and projects that ultimately increase gentrification. This analysis of gentrification effects in neighborhoods with CBAs might allow us to shift conversations in community and economic development to a framework that challenges the language of concessions and negotiations, creating community self-determination.
Reframing CBAs: Negotiating Defeats?
In this section, I reframe CBAs in two ways: (1) CBAs as reflections of the city’s failure to provide basic needs like housing and to facilitate democratic planning processes and (2) CBAs as negotiated defeats. I also highlight that CBA signatories view development as inevitable. This report centers community autonomy to analyze CBAs. When community organizations and scholars view development as inevitable, developers and city officials continue to decide the fate of communities, rather than allowing communities to envision their futures.
CBAs represent the city’s failure to incorporate residents’ voices in deciding what gets built (or not). Communities do not receive adequate information about the development due to a lack of transparency. For example, a CBA signatory from the LA Live CBA noted that community members (community organizations, economic justice organizations, unions) only learned about the plan for the development in LA Live from a newspaper article.58 In that newspaper article, the plan for LA Live was quoted to be inclusive and participatory, however, no community members were invited to the planning process. Months later, community organizations signed a CBA with developers of LA Live. This example illustrates that CBAs emerge in the context of an absolute lack of public input during development planning.
If developers decide on a development privately and then later negotiate community benefits, these arrangements undermine community autonomy. Traditional analysis of citizen participation categorizes citizen power into eight rungs of a ladder, which include “citizen power” to “manipulation.”59 Citizen power is a situation that empowers residents and allows them to have their own agency. Manipulation means that residents’ inputs are not fully considered.60 According to the ladder of citizen participation, negotiating benefits after the fate of the community has been decided is not citizen power. As Cynthia Strathmann, the Executive Director of SAJE, elaborates: “you should have had the community in there designing what was gonna happen from the get-go. You shouldn’t be in a position where you’re just trying to mitigate whatever craziness they’ve already decided on.”61 Hence, I argue that rather than celebrating small gains achieved through CBAs, highlighting the lack of community autonomy in CBA negotiations is a necessary reframing.
Even for community organizations that sign CBAs, these negotiations are signs of the city’s persistent failure to provide accountability and basic needs. When asked what the main reflections on CBAs were, a CBA signatory for LA Live and other CBAs in LA shared the following: “We don’t want to be in the business of CBAs. We want a city policy that protects renters and community members, we want accountability from the city.”62 As these reflections illustrate, while executive directors of non-profit groups sign CBAs, they remain critical of how such an arrangement reflects the inherent failure of public entities and adds labor for their organizations. In general, no resources are allocated within CBAs for successful monitoring.63 The persistent failure of the city to ensure accountability in development is often the pretext for non-profit organizations to negotiate CBAs.
In addition, CBA negotiations still uphold the power of the developer and city officials. Final provisions in CBAs, for example, require developers to allocate a small percentage of housing as affordable. When asked how final provisions of CBAs, such as a 5% affordable housing provision, were determined, a CBA signatory for LA Live and other CBAs in LA shared: “Well, we pushed. We started with 20%. So do I think that 5 % affordability in a building of 144 luxury units is acceptable? I do not. But it is really a question of how we manage our leverage, where we have leverage, where we don’t have leverage. And what is the best deal we can get to make sure that this abomination can provide a meaningful benefit for our community? But we are starting from a failure.”67 The language of “leverage” only extends sympathy to developers and elected officials, placing communities’ housing needs on hold. As organizers and scholars in the School of Echoes Los Angeles remind, such negotiations of affordable housing and density bonuses through CBAs become “an alibi for the social cleansing of whole communities.”68
CBAs in LA also tell a story of an often unquestioned myth: that development is inevitable. Signatories of CBAs have argued that these negotiations are necessary because stopping the development was impossible. For example, in an interview concerning LA Live CBA, a former executive director of a community organization is quoted thus: “We (had) lots of conversation about what could be the most, the best we could get out of this. And keep in mind that it was basically impossible to stop it. So, we can certainly, you know, have an impact on you know more considerations. But, you know, there’s no way to stop that. So what was the best we can get out of these (negotiations) to make it better.”69 Other interviewees shared similar responses. Such accounts demonstrate that development continues to be viewed as an inevitable process.
As described in this section, the framework of CBAs is against the self-determination of communities. How are we to understand an agreement that manipulates the public under the guise of participation, upholds the power of a developer, maintains the myth of development as inevitable, burdens community organizations for implementation, and secures little gains for communities’ basic needs? This report rejects the narrative of inevitability and repeats the analysis that housing justice organizers at School of Echoes have articulated: CBAs are negotiations of defeats.70
Moving forward: A case for non-negotiations and alternatives
As shown throughout this report, what is at stake here are important questions about community self-determination. In this section, I draw lessons from anti-gentrification organizers in LA to argue that gentrification and development can be challenged with collective resistance. In doing so, this report calls for a shift in focus from community concessions to community autonomy.
Crenshaw Subway Coalition: Resistance in Crenshaw
The Crenshaw Subway Coalition is a grassroots group that uplifts community-driven planning.68 Started as a group that demanded changes to Metro projects, the coalition has shifted focus to equitable and accountable development.69 A grassroots group, Crenshaw Subway Coalition, has clear principles for alternative forms of development. This vision centers residents’ right to self-determination; communities should have the power to define the future they want. The coalition also abides by the principle of the right to protection from displacement and community wealth building. These principles provide examples of a language different from the language of concessions that CBAs promote.
In their organizing efforts, the Crenshaw Coalition makes visible the extractive processes of redevelopment. For example, when the redevelopment of Baldwin Hills Crenshaw Mall was proposed, the Coalition highlighted the unaffordability of proposed market-rate housing apartments for community members.70 The Coalition has articulated the risk of displacement of long-time residents. While the Coalition’s struggles to resist development continues, this group inspires us to think of an alternative to concessions: development without displacement, development with real community benefits, and development led by residents.
NOlympics LA: Fight against the Olympics
NOlympics LA organizes to cancel the Olympics in LA. Rather than working with the existing political system to host a “better” Olympics or to negotiate deals, NOlympics is a“no” campaign.71 In their organizing efforts, NOlympics LA recognizes the common faulty narrative: the Olympics are “inevitable” once the bid is awarded. NOlympics LA actively challenges this myth of inevitability. Using lessons from cities, such as Boston, where Olympics have been cancelled with community resistance, NOlympics LA fights to cancel Olympics even if the Olympic bid has been awarded.
The motives for stopping the Olympics are two-folds. First, Angelenos had no say in whether the city should host the Olympics. Organizers in NOlympics LA oppose the undemocratic decision to invest millions of dollars for a two-week sporting event. To critique the lack of democracy in the Olympics decision making is to push for a future where community voices are heard. Second, NOlympics LA members are well-aware that mega sporting events like the Olympics displace people. In a city with acute housing problems, Olympics takes resources away from residents’ essential needs. Rejecting the language of allocating a few percent of “affordable housing” and mitigating harm, this group stresses how Olympics removes rent-controlled units. This group, thus, highlights a struggle to assert the community’s right to be protected from displacement.
While NOlympics LA is a group focused on Olympics, the group organizes beyond the Olympics. Broadly, NOlympics LA aims to create a city where people, and not speculators and financial elites, decide the city’s future.72 Such political messaging rejects the myth that development is unavoidable. In doing so, the group sets examples of a fight that resists the tropes of negotiations, pushing for complete community autonomy.
Boyle Heights Alliance Against Artwashing and Displacement: Refusal of Artwashing
In Boyle Heights, the Boyle Heights Alliance Against Artwashing and Displacement (BHAAAD) was a powerful coalition that fiercely resisted gentrification and displacement. This group constituted a community of organizers from Union de Vecinos, Defend Boyle Heights, Multiple Affinity Group Artists, School of Echoes Los Angeles, and the Eastside Local of the Los Angeles Tenants Union (LATU). Collectively, this group rejected predatory real estate practices and insists on community control over land-use decisions. While dominant narratives view gentrification as redevelopment and revitalization, BHAAD framed gentrification as a purposefully produced outcome that replaces the poor for profit. 73
BHAAAD fought for community veto power. In their organizing, they argued that negotiations with the developer and public officials behind closed doors will not serve poor residents.74 For BHAAD, inviting community members in consultations to fulfill a planning requirement alone will not help resist gentrification. BHAAD envisioned a future in which when community members say NO, development stops.75 BHAAD’s strategy to fight for community control worked successfully.
Conclusion
I conclude by repeating the analysis that scholars and thinkers at the School of Echoes share: CBAs are tools that have been used to negotiate community defeats. As evidence from this study shows, census tracts in development with CBAs in LA witnessed accelerated gentrification. Besides, these negotiations emerge from the failure of city officials to hold developers accountable. Although signed as a tool for the community, the general public in LA have no ways of finding information about CBA implementation. Ultimately, CBAs uphold the myth of development as inevitable. To negotiate with developers on concessions is to strip community’s veto power.
Alternatives to CBAs do exist. As ongoing struggles of anti-gentrification organizers have shown, what we need is a framework that rejects the myth of inevitability of development.
What is also needed is continued resistance and political analysis to fight for community’s self autonomy. The right of a community to envision a future they want is non-negotiable.
Appendices
| Name of CBAs | Year Signed |
| Hollywood and Highland | 1998 |
| LA Live | 2001 |
| NoHo Commons | 2001 |
| SunQuest Industrial Park | 2001 |
| Marlton Square | 2002 |
| LAX Airport Expansion | 2004 |
| Hollywood and Vine | 2004 |
| Grand Avenue | 2004 |
| Lorenzo Project | 2011 |
| Grand Metropolitan Project | 2015 |
| Name of CBA Signatory Organizations Interviewed |
| Esperanza Community Housing Corporation (Esperanza) |
| Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy |
| Lennox Coordinating Council |
| Public Law Group |
| Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE) |
Appendix 3: Semi-structured interview instrument
- Emergence and context
- What did the process for preparing a CBA look like for your community organization?
- What were some community concerns at the time that this project was proposed?
- How involved was the City in the process of preparing the CBA?
- What was the role of labor and county fed in the elaboration of CBAs?
- Monitoring and enforcement
- In many CBAs, developers agreed to submit annual, bi-annual, and quarterly reports to community organizations. Can you speak more about those reporting requirements and your engagement in implementation and monitoring of CBAs?
- Negotiation
- What other organizations were involved in these negotiations?
- What kind of training and materials/workshops were developed to organize/educate the community in support of CBA?
- At the time the CBA was signed, what was the condition of housing and affordability nearby the proposed development?
- How was the decision regarding who to invite to coalitions made?
- How were specific provisions in CBAs decided? How did you land on the affordable housing component of the CBA?
- What were some considerations in terms of costs and benefits in terms of displacement and development at that time? What were your expectations in terms of replacement of lost housing and protections for those that would be displaced? (P)
- What were some things you wanted to include in CBA but were not included? What sacrifices were made for the CBA?
- Reflections
- At the time you were working on the CBA, did you receive support from the media? Which media? How did you work with the media?
- How would you change/adapt the CBAs in asserting the needs and priorities of the community during “development”?
- What do you think are alternatives to the CBA process?
| CBA Project | Census Tracts |
| Hollywood and Highland | 1896, 1897.02, 1899.03, 1899.04, 1901, 1902.01, 1902.02, 1907 |
| Hollywood and Vine | 1895, 1896, 1902.01, 1907, 1908.01, 1908.02, 1909.02, 1910 |
| NoHo Commons | 1242.04, 1252, 1253.1, 1253.2, 1254.01 |
| LA Live | 2077.1, 2079, 2093, 2100.1, 2240.1, 2242 |
| Grand Ave | 2073.01, 2073.02, 2074, 2075.01, 2075.02, 2077.1, 2080 |
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Notes
[1]Gross, “Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal Enforceability”
[2] Salkin, and Lavine, “Negotiating for Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current and Developing Agreements.”; Camacho, “Community benefits agreements: symptom, not the antidote, of bilateral land use regulation”
[3] Wolf-Powers, “Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government”
[4] The Public Law Center, “Summary and Index of Community Benefits Agreements”
[5] Urban Land Institute: Louisiana CrossReach Initiative and The Public Law Center, “Win-win-win :Advantages of CBA’s for the Community, Developers, Government, and You!”
[6] The Public Law Center. “Summary and Index of Community Benefits Agreements.”
[7] Marcello, “Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for Investment in America’s Neighborhoods Annual Review of the Law: Recent Developments in Land Use, Planning and Zoning Law”
[8] Wolf-Powers, “Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government”
[9] Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, “Community Benefit Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable”
[10] Wolf-Powers, “Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government”
[11] Wolf-Powers, “Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government”
[12] Parks and Warren, “The Politics and Practice of Economic Justice: Community Benefits Agreements as Tactic of the New Accountable Development Movement
[13] Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, “Community Benefit Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable”
[14] Camacho, “Community benefits agreements: symptom, not the antidote, of bilateral land use regulation”
[15] Salkin, and Lavine, “Negotiating for Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current and Developing Agreements.”
[16] Salkin, and Lavine, “Negotiating for Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current and Developing Agreements.”
[17] Community Benefits Blogspot, “Community Benefits Agreements”
[18] Marlton Square in Hollywood and Sunquest Industrial Park in Pacoima.; see Public Law Center, “Summary and Index of Community Benefit Agreements”
[19] Musil, “Developer/Community Contracts: The Emergence of Community Benefit Agreements in Real Estate Development”
[20]Wolf-Powers, “Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government”
[21] Community Benefits Blogspot, “NoHo Commons”
[22] Baxamusa, “Empowering Communities through Deliberation The Model of Community Benefits Agreements”
[23] Marcello, “Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for Investment in America’s Neighborhoods Annual Review of the Law: Recent Developments in Land Use, Planning and Zoning Law”
[24] Cummings, “The Emergence of Community Benefits Agreements Editor’s Note.”
[25] Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, “Community Benefit Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable”
[26] Belongie and Silverman, “Model CBAs and Community Benefit Ordinances as Tools for Negotiating Equitable Development: Three Critical Cases”
[27] Wolf-Powers, “Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government”
[28] Been “Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?
[29] Parks and Warren, “The Politics and Practice of Economic Justice: Community Benefits Agreements as Tactic of the New Accountable Development Movement”
[30] Cummings, “The Emergence of Community Benefits Agreements Editor’s Note”
[31] Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, “Community Benefit Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable
[32] Former executive director of a CBA signatory organization that signed multiple CBAs in LA, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed); Executive director of a CBA signatory organization that signed multiple CBAs in LA, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed)
[33] Executive director of a community organization that signed the LA Live CBA, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed)
[34] Executive director of a CBA signatory of Lorenzo Project, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed)
[35] Patricia, “The Valley; NoHo Commons Developers Offer Scaled-Back Plan; Revitalization: The New Proposal would Cut the Number of Homes but Increase the Size of Units. some Retail Space also would be Reduced”
[36] Patricia, “The Valley; NoHo Commons Developers Offer Scaled-Back Plan; Revitalization: The New Proposal would Cut the Number of Homes but Increase the Size of Units. some Retail Space also would be Reduced”
[37] Landsberg, “Hollywood may Finally make its Comeback”
[38] Patrick and Beth Shuster,”$123-Million Crenshaw Project Goes to Council; Vote on Marlton Square is Likely to be Positive Despite Questions about Subsidy, Political Ties”
Haddad, “KB Home, Anschutz to Take Over Planned Hotel, Condo Project Near Staples Center”
[39] Patrick and Beth Shuster,”$123-Million Crenshaw Project Goes to Council; Vote on Marlton Square is Likely to be Positive Despite Questions about Subsidy, Political Ties”
[40] McGreevy, “The Valley; Landfill Sale to Developer Gets 1st Council OK; Sun Valley: Business park planned for site of closed dump and nearby yard could bring 1,000 jobs to troubled area”
[41] McGreevy, “The Valley; Landfill Sale to Developer Gets 1st Council OK; Sun Valley: Business park planned for site of closed dump and nearby yard could bring 1,000 jobs to troubled area”
[42] McGreevy, “Los Angeles; $31.7-Million N. Hollywood Project OKd; Redevelopment: Aid package for commercial core near subway station awaits City Council OK
[43] Landsberg, “Hollywood may finally make its comeback”
[44] Bernstein, “Renewal of Area a Question of Time; Secession Advocates Say Hollywood would be Redeveloped Faster if it were Independent”
[45] School of Echoes Los Angeles, “Flipping the Script on Artwashing”
[46] Newton, “LAX Expansion would Displace 190 Businesses, Galanter Says”
[47] Pool, “Shop Won’t have to Pack its Bags”
[48] Bernstein, “Renewal of Area a Question of Time; Secession Advocates Say Hollywood would be Redeveloped Faster if it were Independent”
[49] Landsberg, “Hollywood may Finally make its Comeback”
[50] Cohen and Pettit, “Guide to measuring neighborhood change to understand and prevent displacement”; Urban Displacement Project, “Mapping Neighborhood Change and Gentrification in Southern California County”
[1] Chapple, Waddell, Chatman, et.al., “Developing a New Methodology for Analyzing Potential Displacement”
[52] Chum, “The impact of gentrification on residential evictions”
[53] Los Angeles Tenants Union, “Ellis Act Evictions”
[54] In this report, the category white residents does not include Hispanic whites. Here, whites are non-Hispanic.
[55] Chapple, Waddell, Chatman, et.al., “Developing a New Methodology for Analyzing Potential Displacement”
[58] School of Echoes Los Angeles, “Flipping the Script on Artwashing”
[59] Former executive director of a CBA signatory organization that signed multiple CBAs in LA, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed)
[60] School of Echoes Los Angeles, “Flipping the script of art-washing”
[61] Former executive director of a CBA signatory organization that signed multiple CBAs in LA, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed)
[62] Arnstein, “Ladder of Citizen Participation”
[63] Arnstein, “Ladder of Citizen Participation”
[64] NOlympics LA, “A City for the People: Strategic Actions for a Just Economy in Profile”
[65] Executive director of a CBA signatory organization that signed multiple CBAs in LA, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed)
[66] Executive director of a CBA signatory organization that signed multiple CBAs in LA, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed)
[67] Executive director of a CBA signatory organization that signed multiple CBAs in LA, Interview with author (See Appendix for list of organizations interviewed)
[72] Boykoff, “NOlympians Inside the fight against capitalist mega-sports in Los Angeles, Tokyo, and Beyond”
[73] School of Echoes Los Angeles, “Flipping the Script on Artwashing”
[74] School of Echoes Los Angeles, “Flipping the Script on Artwashing”
[75] School of Echoes Los Angeles, “Flipping the Script on Artwashing”